Abstract-Rate-distortion theory is considered for the Shannon cipher system (SCS). The admissible region of cryptogram rate R, key rate R k , legitimate receiver's distortion D, and wiretapper's uncertainty h is determined for the SCS with a noisy channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Shannon cipher system (SCS) has been studied by various authors [2] - [12] , where only distortionless coding was treated. In this paper, we consider the so-called ratedistortion problem for the SCS.
In the distortionless case, it is well known, e.g., see [1] , that if secret information must be transmitted to the legitimate receiver and the uncertainty of a wiretapper must be kept at least , i.e., where is a cryptogram, then the admissible region of cryptogram rate and key rate is given by
However, if some distortion is allowed at the legitimate receiver, and can be reduced less than and , respectively.
It is obvious from the ordinary rate-distortion theorem that if perfect secrecy is required, i.e., , and distortion is allowed, then and can be reduced to the rate-distortion function . However, for any , except in such extreme cases, we cannot determine the admissible rate region from the ordinary rate-distortion theorem and the known results for the SCS.
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Publisher Item Identifier S 0018-9448(97)02315-8. SCS with a less noisy discrete broadcast channel (LDBC) or a Gaussian wiretap channel (GWC), and we will show that the admissible region can be achieved by concatenating three codes that attain the ordinary rate-distortion function, the admissible region of the LDBC (or the secrecy capacity of the GWC), and the admissible region of the distortionless case given by (1), (2), respectively. In the above discussion, we assumed that the security of the system is measured by the uncertainty of a wiretapper, i.e.,
. However, instead of the uncertainty, the security of the system can be measured by the minimum distortion that a wiretapper can attain. Lu [5] treated a coding problem of such security measure. But his result is not general because he assumed that only the additive-like instantaneous block cipher can be used and wiretappers can also use only the similar additive-like instantaneous decoder. Furthermore, the reproduction sequence of the legitimate receiver was not allowed distortion in his analysis. In this paper, we will consider a coding problem under a general situation such that a general block cipher can be used, a wiretapper has unlimited calculation power, is allowed distortion , and the security of the system is measured by the attainable minimum distortion of the wiretapper. The inner and outer regions of the admissible quadruple are derived. The formal and precise statement of the problem and the main results are given in Section II. The proofs of the coding theorem are shown in Sections III and IV for the cases when the security of the system is measured by the uncertainty and the attainable minimum distortion of the wiretapper, respectively.
II. SHANNON CIPHER SYSTEM
Consider the SCS with a memoryless broadcast channel shown in Fig. 1 (6)- (8) and (10) where and is a per-letter distortion measure that a wiretapper uses.
Note that can be defined only for discrete sources while can be applied for both discrete and continuous sources. may be different from . If the source is discrete and the channel is an LDBC or a GWC, is determined by the following theorem. 
where , , and are the ordinary rate-distortion function, the channel capacity of the main channel, and the secrecy capacity of the GWC [14] , respectively, and is defined as (15) (The proof is given in Section III.)
We note that if distortion is allowed, then the code attaining has uncertainty bits about . Furthermore, if we transmit some information via the LDBC or the GWC at rate , then the wiretapper's uncertainty about the information is or bits [13] , [14] . Expressions (12) and (14) mean that these uncertainties can be utilized independently in the SCS. Actually, can be attained by concatenating three codes designed for the ordinary SCS, the rate-distortion function, and the broadcast channel, respectively. (See Section III for more details. ) We can show that even for a continuous source, Theorem 1 holds if we use differential entropy instead of discrete entropy, i.e., if we replace (9) in Definition 1 and (12), (14) 
The cardinalities of and can be bounded as follows:
(The proofs are given in Section IV.) We note that (24) and (27) coincide with each other if constant or . " constant" corresponds to the case of , i.e., the case of the perfect secrecy. On the other hand, "
" corresponds to the case of , i.e., the case when we cannot use the key channel. In this case, the admissible region becomes as follows. This region coincides with the result shown in [16] , which treats the case of and it is shown that even for , the minimum distortion of a wiretapper can be enlarged by devising the encoding if is different from and we can use more rate than .
III. PROOFS OF THEOREM 1 AND COROLLARY 1
A. Converse Part of Theorem 1
We first treat the case of LDBC, i.e., we show that if there exits a code that satisfies (6)-(9), then (11) and (12) On the other hand, can be bounded from (7) as follows:
where holds because of (9 is a convex function of ; 10)
is a nonincreasing function of , and from (8). Now we introduce an auxiliary r.v. , which is independent of all other r.v.'s and uniformly distributed over , and we define r.v.'s as follows:
Then, we have
where the last inequality can be derived from the Markov chain and Lemma A1 in the Appendix. Furthermore, from (37), the bracketed part of (35) 
B. Direct Part of Theorem 1
The direct part of Theorem 1 can be proved by concatenating three codes that attain the ordinary rate-distortion function, the admissible region of the LDBC or GWC, and the admissible region of the SCS. Although the proof is easy and straightforward, the exact description is long and tedious. Hence, we give only the outline of the proof here. Fig. 2 shows the relation (12) or (14) . The information , which can be represented by (approximately) bits, is divided into four parts. If the reproduction sequence is allowed distortion , then the necessary bit length to represent is bits, which corresponds to parts . In other words, has uncertainty bits about . It is well known that this (represented by bits) can be transmitted to the legitimate receiver with arbitrarily small error probability if (11) or (13) (12) or (14) . Then a wiretapper can get only part , and his uncertainty becomes bits.
C. Proof of Corollary 1
We can easily verify that Theorem 1 holds even for continuous sources if we replace (9), (12) , and (14) by (16)- (18), respectively. The converse part can be proved by using differential entropy instead of discrete entropy. Furthermore, since the code attaining for a continuous source has uncertainty bits about when the uncertainty is measured by differential conditional entropy (see Lemma A2 in the Appendix), the direct part can also be proved in the same way as the discrete case.
Since is the squared error, the minimum distortion of wiretappers is given by (48) where is the variance of under the condition that is given. On the other hand, the conditional differential entropy can be bounded as follows: (49) where and hold because 14) the differential entropy is maximized by the normal distribution ; 15) is a concave function of . From (48) and (49), we have (50) Inequality (50) means that if holds, then is satisfied. Hence by substituting into (17) or (18), we obtain Corollary 1.
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 2 AND 3

A. Proof of Theorem 2
Assume that there exits a code that satisfies (6)- (8) and (10) . Then, from (6) and (7), r.v.'s and determined by satisfy the following inequalities:
where and hold because 16) is obtained from and ; 17) is independent of . Furthermore, from (8) and (10), we obtain the following inequalities:
where can be used instead of because the source and channel alphabets are finite.
We now introduce an auxiliary r.v. , which is independent of all other r.v.'s and uniformly distributed over , and we define new r.v.'s , , and as follows:
We have from (51)- (55) and that
Since is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), is independent of . Hence, we obtain (23), (25)-(27) because (57)-(60) hold for any . However, we need further consideration to bound the cardinalities of and . constant" satisfies , we have right side of (64) left side of (64) On the other hand, we have by restricting to right side of (64) left side of (64) Hence, we have from (60) and (64) that (65) Each of the following quantities can be represented in the form of :
Hence, from the support lemma [19, Lemma 3.3.4] , any quadruple and can be attained with . This means that the right sides of (59), (61), (63), and (65) can also be attained with . Similarly, the cardinality of can be bounded with . Finally, by noting that and (64) holds for the reduced and , we obtain (23) and (25)-(27).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We first note from Lemma A4 in the Appendix that the condition (26) can be replaced by (72) Assume that there exist r.v.'s that satisfy the conditions (23)- (25) and (72). We now show by applying the so-called typical sequences technique for the r.v.'s that we can construct a code satisfying (6)- (8) and (10). Let us define the sets of typical sequences and conditional typical sequences as follows. 
